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QUEST FOR A BRIGHT LINE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
RULE IN CONTRACT DISPUTES-Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
The United States Supreme Court has returned to a personal jurisdiction
methodology similar to that used a century ago. Under the traditional
nineteenth century doctrine, the Court applied concrete and mechanical
rules in jurisdiction disputes. With increased social mobility and tech-
nological advancements, however, these rules became inadequate. Re-
sponding to the deficiencies of its doctrine, the Supreme Court formulated
a flexible test for personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington. I Gradually, the Court's flexible test turned into a vague doctrine,
incapable of consistent application by lower courts. The inconsistency
caused by the Court's rule also affected businesses that desired predic-
tability for conducting their transactions. Accordingly, since the late
1970's, the Court has been chipping away at the abstract, flexible test
enunciated in International Shoe by reasserting bright line, concrete juris-
dictional rules for various factual situations.
Recently, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 2 the Court stopped short
of providing a concrete rule for personal jurisdiction disputes in contract
situations. Prior movement toward bright line tests, however, suggests that
the Court is searching for a personal jurisdiction rule applicable to contract
cases. The Court should adopt, for contract disputes, a rule favoring buyer's
or consumer's forums. A clear rule is particularly crucial for contract
relationships where predictability and certainty are prime objectives. 3 The
most satisfactory rule for obtaining certainty in contract cases would, at the
threshold, determine whether one of the contracting parties is an individual
consumer or a commercial buyer.4 If an individual consumer is participat-
ing in the transaction, the consumer's forum should be the place of
litigation. 5 If there is no individual consumer, there should be a presump-
tion in favor of the commercial buyer's forum as the place of litigation. 6
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
3. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 910-11 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (in commercial relations "certainty of result is a prime
objective").
4. See infra notes 153-58, 175-203 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 153-59, 175-93 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 153-60, 194-203 and accompanying text.
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I. OVERVIEW: EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
STANDARDS
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Supreme
Court articulated personal jurisdiction rules based on the sovereign powers
of state courts.7 This territorial doctrine of personal jurisdiction, sym-
bolized by Pennoyer v. Neff 8 and based on notions of presence, consent,
and domicile, lent itself to easy, though rigid, applications. 9
Traditional territorial theories of personal jurisdiction, based on state
sovereignty rights, gradually produced inadequate results. 10 Confronted
with an increasingly mobile population, courts could not rely on the
territorial doctrine to reach defendants such as out-of-state motorists.lI
7. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064, at 208 (1969)
(flexibility not the motivating principle for adoption of the territorial concept of personal jurisdiction).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Pennoyer involved an ejectment action where Marcus Neff sought recovery
of Oregon land he had owned. Sylvester Pennoyer defended by asserting title from a sheriff's deed given
at an execution sale. The execution sale stemmed from an earlier judgment against Neff in favor of an
attorney, J. H. Mitchell, for services rendered by Mitchell. There was no personal service on Neff, who
was out of state, in the action by Mitchell against Neff for the attorney's fees. A default judgment was
entered against Neff when he failed to appear. Neff's land was attached and sold to Pennoyer under a
sheriff's deed. The Supreme Court held the original default judgment invalid and asserted that presence
of the defendant in the forum was a prerequisite to the assertion of personal jurisdiction unless the
defendant consented to jurisdiction.
9. For a preeminent example of rigid application of'jurisdiction rules, see Grace v. MacArthur, 170
F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (presence rule allowed jurisdiction over a person "moving in
interstate commerce ... in a regular commercial aircraft, flying in the regular navigable airspace above
the [forum] State"); see also Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284,285, 3 So. 321 (1888) (general rule is that
"every country has jurisdiction over all persons found within its territorial limits . . . . [hiowever
transiently the defendant may have been in the State").
10. See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241
(Pennoyer's rules gradually abandoned). See also Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and
the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW 699,
699-700 (1983). Lewis argues that state sovereignty notions "served as the centerpiece of Pennoyer v.
Neff" and have resurfaced several times even though such notions should have been rendered obsolete
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
and Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
The problem with the consent basis of jurisdiction was that a state could determine the existence of
implied or express consent from a corporation's transaction of interstate business within the forum even
though the state could not constitutionally exclude the corporation from transacting business in the
forum. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1066, at 220 (citing International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (determining the existence of consent from business activity in
forum), and International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910) (inability to exclude corporation
doing interstate business)).
The problem with the presence theory was that courts found it difficult, if not impossible, to give a
corporation a place of presence without imputing to the corporation the activities of shareholders,
officers, or agents. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). In
practice, the crucial factual determination turned on whether a corporation was "doing business"
within the forum. However, presence and doing business were themselves conclusory terms that
provided little guidance in determining whether or how much business was conducted in the forum. Id.
II. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1065, at 214-17.
Personal Jurisdiction in Contract Cases
Moreover, interstate commerce developed at a rapid pace. Under the
traditional bases of jurisdiction, courts did not have sufficient means to
attain personal jurisdiction over nonresidents not physically present in the
forum, but doing business in the forum. 12 The United States Supreme
Court responded to this problem inInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington.13
The Court altered the foundation of personal jurisdiction from presence,
consent, and domicile, to the existence of minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum. 14 The new minimum contacts standard served to
ensure that a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction would be reason-
able, 15 thus satisfying due process requirements. 16
After International Shoe, many courts broadly asserted personal juris-
diction over parties not previously amenable to suit. 17 The new standard did
not base personal jurisdiction on clear cut rules as the Pennoyer test did. 18
Instead, application of the new standard required courts to examine the
facts of each case before determining whether the quality and nature of a
nonresident's activity with a forum allowed the nonresident to be fairly
subjected to a suit in the forum.19 Courts thus had greater discretion to
weigh the facts of each case and assert jurisdiction when it seemed fair.
12. Id. § 1067, at 224.
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. Id. at 316.
15. Id.
16. The due process clause "is the only source ofthe personaljrisdiction requirement." Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982). The
requirement mentioned by the Ireland Court is "that there be 'minimum contacts' between the
nonresident defendant and the forum State." Id. Due process questions arose after International Shoe
when defendants challenged personal jurisdiction on the ground that their rights would be violated
without a finding of minimum contacts. The Pennoyer Court had earlier relied on due process rights, but
equated those rights with the satisfaction of state sovereignty requirements.
17. Much of the expansion of personal jurisdiction resulted from the increased use of long-arm
statutes. After International Shoe, many state legislatures passed "single-act" long-arm statutes that
allowed personal jurisdiction when nonresidents were doing business in the state, see, e.g., Federal Ins.
Co. v. Michigan Wheel Co., 267 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Fla. 1967), when nonresidents committed any one
of the enumerated acts within the forum, see, e.g., Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. DornierWerke, 343 F.2d 861
(5th Cir. 1965), or, in some instances, when nonresidents committed acts outside the forum but caused
effects within the forum, see, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, §§ 1068-69.
18. The Pennoyer Court ruled that personal jurisdiction is valid if a defendant was personally
served within the forum, voluntarily appeared there, or otherwise consented to jurisdiction. See 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1064, at 209. The International Shoe Court did not provide set
rules, but "merely furnishe[d] a guide by which each case may be decided on its particular facts." 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1067, at 233. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958) ("[Ihe requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule
of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310.").
19. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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The International Shoe standard proved difficult for courts to apply
because of its susceptibility to different interpretations.20 The Court articu-
lated the new personal jurisdiction standard as one test, but formed the test
around two components: (1) minimum contacts or the defendant's affilia-
tion with the forum, and (2) fair play and reasonableness. 2 Two distinct
ways of viewing this bifurcated test emerged, each of which stressed one
component over the the other.22 While the Court initially emphasized
reasonableness, eventually it settled on the defendant's affiliation with the
forum. Questions developed, however, about the purpose of the minimum
contacts requirement: was it a requirement intended to protect the individ-
ual liberty interest of the defendant or was it a requirement meant to restrict
each state's power?23
In addition to questions about its purpose, the minimum contacts stan-
dard proved difficult to apply because few precedential rules emerged from
the Supreme Court. In the first dozen years after International Shoe, the
Supreme Court decided personal jurisdiction disputes on a case by case
basis, weighing the specific facts of each case but failing to explain the
weight of the various facts. Lower courts had little guidance for deciding
when to exercise jurisdiction. The Court, after almost twenty years of
silence, responded to the lower court problem by fashioning a series of
bright line personal jurisdiction rules, each applicable to a different fact
pattern and each based upon hidden nondoctrinal issues.24 The Court has
followed this pattern of setting forth distinct guidelines in each of its
personal jurisdiction cases since 1977.
In 1985, the Supreme Court addressed personal jurisdiction questions in
the context of contractual relationships. In Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 25 the Court attempted to clarify and reemphasize its explana-
tion of the ambiguities in personal jurisdiction doctrine. The Court also
solidified emphasis on the defendant's contacts.26 The Court characterized
the minimum contacts requirement as a threshold inquiry, while notions of
fair play and reasonableness formed a secondary inquiry.27 The Burger
King opinion also reaffirmed that minimum contacts are constitutionally
necessary to protect defendants' liberty interests.28 Despite the recent
20. See infra notes 30-59 and accompanying text.
21. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
22. See infra notes 30-59 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 60-116 and accompanying text.
25. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
26. Id. at 2183.
27. Id. at 2182, 2184. See infra notes 30-59 and accompanying text for development of the Court's
two-pronged jurisdiction test.
28. Id. at 2183.
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pattern of bright line rules, the Burger King opinion did not produce a
workable rule for contract cases. 29
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO-PRONGED PERSONAL
JURISDICTION TEST EMPHASIZING MINIMUM CONTACTS:
INTERNATIONAL SHOE AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
The Supreme Court, in International Shoe,30 departed from prior case
law to allow personal jurisdiction if a defendant has "certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'' 31 One
interpretation of the Court's language used fair play and substantial justice
as the standard against which minimum contacts are measured, thus tying
the two concepts together. 32 An alternative interpretation of International
Shoe's phraseology separated the two concepts into two requirements: (1)
contacts, ties, or relations between the defendant and the forum (minimum
contacts), and (2) reasonableness (fair play and substantial justice).33
The phrase "such that" in the Court's articulation of the minimum
contacts standard seems deliberately to connect the two concepts: mini-
mum contacts and fair play. 34 However, in later cases, particularly Hanson
29. See infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
30. 326 U.S. 310. In International Shoe, Washington State sought to impose unemployment
compensation taxes on International Shoe Company for payments made by the company to its salesmen
in Washington. Id. at 313. The company's salesmen lived in Washington and earned commissions of
over $31,000 annually. Id. International Shoe Company, incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in Missouri, employed salesmen who lived and solicited business in Washington. Id.
Washington State assessed unemployment compensation taxes against International Shoe based on the
salesmen's commissions. Id. at 312. The company refused to pay the taxes and was served by the Tax
Commissioner with an order and notice of assessment. Id. Service was made on one of the resident sales
agents and by mailing notice to International Shoe's Missouri offices. Id. The defendant argued that the
company was not present in the state and that the statute allowing service by mail violated the due
process clause. Id. at 315.
The Supreme Court concluded that the company's activities in Washington were systematic and
continuous. Id. at 320. International Shoe's activities resulted in a large volume of interstate business
from which the company received the benefits and protections of the laws of Washington. Id. Moreover,
the tax liability at issue arose out of those continuous activities. Id. The Court held that the activities
constituted minimum contacts that made it fair and reasonable for a Washington court to assert
jurisdiction. Id. International Shoe did not present a difficult set of facts for identifying minimum
contacts. See Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal,
59 N.C.L. REV. 429, 460 (1981). The Court recognized that, in subsequent cases, more difficult
assessments of the contacts that justify subjecting of a defendant to jurisdiction would arise. 326 U.S. at
319.
31. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
32. See J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 125 n.9 (1985).
33. Id.
34. See id.
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v. Denckla,35 the Court used minimum contacts to protect state sov-
ereignty. 36 The Hanson Court characterized the minimum contacts inquiry
as a threshold requirement designed to ensure that the forum state has
power to adjudicate. 37 Reasonableness considerations were relegated to
secondary significance. 38 Thus, the Court in Hanson began pointing to the
second interpretation of International Shoe: minimum contacts as a thresh-
old requirement and fair play as a secondary inquiry.
In World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson,39 the Supreme Court
seemed to validate the second interpretation by explicitly severing personal
jurisdiction analysis into a two-pronged test. The World-Wide Court stated
that the minimum contacts requirement has two functions: (1) ensuring that
the forum state does not impinge on the sovereignty of other states, and (2)
protecting the defendant against the burdens of defending a suit in an
inconvenient forum. 40
35. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, the Court first suggested that contacts act as a threshold limit
to protect territorial sovereignty. See id. at 251. Reasonableness factors were thus relegated to a lesser
significance even though they would not be fully articulated until World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See Jay, supra note 30, at 439 (1981); see also infra text accompanying
notes 51-55 for a list of the reasonableness factors.
The Court, 22 years after the Hanson decision, provided explicit evidence, in World-Wide, of a two-
pronged jurisdiction analysis. Recent hornbook law indicates that the threshold prong refers to
minimum contacts. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 32, at 125 n.9. See infra text
accompanying notes 129-32 for Burger King's indication that fair warning is another label for the
threshold determination. Only when minimum contacts are found to exist do fair play and substantial
justice become relevant considerations. The fair play and justice considerations have been labeled as the
reasonableness branch. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 32, at 125 n.9.
36. Hanson, 357 U.S. 235. The Court stated that "[h]owever minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts'
with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him." Id. at 251.
37. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. See Jay, supra note 30, at 439 n.57.
38. The other considerations regarding reasonableness were pre-World-Wide opinions and were
fully synthesized in World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55 for a list of
the reasonableness requirements.
39. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
40. Id. at 292. See generally Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L.
REv. 1015, 1042 n.118 (1983). Professor Drobak explained that the term "minimum contacts" has had
various interpretations since its use in World-Wide:
When it used the term minimum contacts, the [World-Wide] Court meant prelitigation connections
with the forum state sufficient to meet the requirements ofInternational Shoe. To some courts and
commentators, the term minimum contacts represents the entire personal jurisdiction doctrine
composed of one test requiring prelitigation connections with the forum that are analyzed in the
context of many different factors. See, e.g., Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227, 230 (1967); Hazard, Revisiting the Second
Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 564,
568-72 (1981). To other courts and commentators, the term minimum contacts represents the
prelitigation connections that meet the power test of jurisdiction while the other factors are
considered under a second test requiring the forum to be reasonable. See, e.g., Clermont,
Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
411,413-29 (1981); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and
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World-Wide's first component, ensuring sovereignty, resurrected the
traditional territorial basis for personal jurisdiction.41 The Court's insis-
tence that minimum contacts protect state sovereignty created a problem.
Previous cases asserted that minimum contacts protect defendants' individ-
ual liberty rights.42 The problem, then, was whether the existence of
minimum contacts, as a means for satisfying due process requirements,
acted to protect individuals' rights or states' rights. If minimum contacts
ensured states' rights, individual defendants would not be able to waive
personal jurisdiction since individuals cannot grant the sovereign powers it
did not previously have.43
The Court clarified its position in Insurance Corp. oflreland v. Compag-
nie des Bauxites de Guinee,44 explaining that sovereignty concerns do not
independently limit personal jurisdiction.45 Instead, the due process clause
should be seen as a preservation of individual liberty interests.46 The
Ireland case repudiated any notion that state sovereignty considerations
would restrict personal jurisdiction if the forum was otherwise reason-
able.47 Nonetheless, minimum contacts are necessary to guarantee the
individual liberty interests.48
the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 730 (1981); cf. Woods, Pennoyer's
Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and A Modest Prediction Regarding
World-Vide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 861, 881-82 (1978) (three-part test,
with Hanson requirement defined as a separate component). Under either model, prelitigation
connections with the forum are of paramount importance.
41. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. See Jay, supra note 30, at 438-40.
42. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1067, at 45 (Supp. 1985).
43. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10
(1982) (individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty).
44. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
45. Id.at702n.10.
46. Id.
47. Lewis, supra note 10, at 723. But see Drobak, supra note 40, at 1015. Professor Drobak argues
that Ireland did nothing more than confirm that federalism is preserved as a by-product of the protection
of litigants rights and that the Court had never expressed otherwise. Id. at 1046-50. Professor Drobak
also states that inconsistency between Ireland and World-Wide would not exist if "we could treat the
explanation in World-Wide Volkswagen as an aberration caused by thoughtless, infelicitous drafting and
so disregard it." Id. at 1047. According to Professor Drobak, Ireland and World-Wide should be and can
be reconciled with each other. Id. Regardless of whether the two opinions can be reconciled,
sovereignty issues are not independent restrictions on personal jurisdiction. At most, Ireland departed
significantly from the suggestion in World-Wide that sovereignty issues act as a real barrier to a court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction. Id.
48. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703 n. 10 ("[O]ur holding today does not alter the requirement that there be
'minimum contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum State.") But see id. at 709
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell argued that the majority has read minimum
contacts out of the personal jurisdiction test and that, under its opinion, the protection of an individual's
liberty interest depends solely on a balancing of the reasonableness factors.
The Ireland majority asserted that the test for personal jurisdiction required that "the maintenance of
the suit. . . not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice." Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). Conspicuously absent from this test is International
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The Ireland Court, while ruling that minimum contacts preserve the
individual liberty interest, did not demonstrate how the minimum contacts
requirement operated to safeguard the individual liberty interest. 49 In
Burger King, the Court explained its position. 50
Under the second component of World-Wide's personal jurisdiction
formulation, the Court emphasized that the defendant's burden should be a
primary factor, but should be determined in the context of four other
factors: the forum state's interest in hearing the case, 51 the plaintiff's
interest in an efficient resolution of the case, 52 the interstate judicial
system's interest in an efficient solution, 53 and the shared interest of all the
states in advancing substantive social policies. 54 These five contextual
factors constitute the "reasonableness" or "fairness" branch of personal
jurisdiction analysis. 55 The reasonableness branch originated in Interna-
tional Shoe's statement that jurisdiction cannot offend "fair play and
substantial justice. "56
World-Wide's reasonableness factors have become the second prong of
the Court's personal jurisdiction test.57 To satisfy the first prong, a defen-
dant must have a minimum affiliation with the forum. 58 Once this threshold
requirement of minimum contacts is satisfied, the reasonableness factors
can be considered. 59
Shoe's requirement of "minimum contacts ... such that" a suit does not offend notions of fair play
and substantial justice. Justice Powell's observation, then, seems valid when examining the Ireland
majority's enunciation of its test. Nevertheless, the Ireland majority stipulated that minimum contacts
are required.
49. Whether sovereignty (as opposed to individual liberty) was a valid personal jurisdiction
consideration, it was nonetheless apparent from World-Wide that minimum contacts preserved state
sovereignty requirements by stipulating that a state does not have power to make a binding judgment
unless the defendant has the requisite contacts, ties, or relations with the forum. World-Wide, 444 U.S.
at 294.
50. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
51. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,223
(1957)).
52. Id. at 292 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 (1978)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
57. World-Wide, 444 U.S.at 291-92.
58. Id. at 294 ("[T]he Due Process Clause does 'not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations."' (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319)).
59. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT TREND TOWARD
BRIGHT LINE PERSONAL JURISDICTION TESTS
In addition to the problem of interpreting International Shoe's test,
commentators have questioned whether jurisdiction disputes should be
solved with an interest balancing test or with bright line rules. 60 Advocates
of interest balancing stress that it is the most precise measure of justice
since all relevant factors are taken into account and weighed against each
other. 61 Since bright line tests usually emphasize a single factor, contervail-
ing interests are left unconsidered. 62 While recognizing its liabilities,
bright line advocates maintain that their method is more efficiently applied
by trial courts and more effectively reviewed by appellate courts. 63
In its most recent cases, the Supreme Court opted for a series of broadly
applicable jurisdictional rules instead of a discretionary balancing test.64
The bright line jurisdiction rules emphasize a single factor-the defen-
dant's minimum contacts with the forum.65
The Court's motive for moving toward clear rules is uncertain. One
commentator, though, has suggested that the Court wanted to dramatically
reassert its traditional role as the supreme enforcer of personal jurisdiction
by making the doctrine easier to review.66 A second motive attributed to the
Court is an interest in preventing lower courts from making biased deci-
sions. Bias results from lower courts having a self-interest in hearing the
60. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407 (1980).
61. See id. at 409, 430-31. Cf. Jay, supra note 30, at 451-52.
62. Advocates of the bright line method recognize the weakness of emphasizing only one factor,
but insist that their method is more efficient. See Louis, supra note 60, at 430-32. According to
Professor Louis, "the balancing test is hardly inherently inimical to the achievement of proper case
results. Indeed, by definition it seeks the 'just' result in every case, whereas the more mechanical
approach obviously does not and cannot." Id. at 430-32.
63. Id. at 43 1-32. Balancing tests require extensive judicial energy since all relevant interests must
be weighed on a case by case basis. Moreover, it is difficult for appellate courts to police balancing tests
since a multitude of factors are weighed and since each decision is potentially distinquishable from any
other. See id. Bright line tests, to the contrary, focus on a single variable, making them easier to apply
and to review. See id.
For the argument that bright line rules are not necessarily cost efficient, see Jay, supra note 30, at 459
.n. 182. According to Professor Jay,
[a]nyone making such an argument would have to lower expectations for cost savings by factoring
the incredible persistence of American lawyers into the equation. Not only will briefs and oral
arguments continue to bring every conceivable factor to the courts' attention, but we can expect
new levels of ingenuity directed toward persuading the trier ....
See also Drobak, supra note 40, at 1057-58. Professor Drobak argues that the Court's bright line
approach emphasizing minimum contacts is justified because it protects defendants from answering to
an unrelated sovereign. Id.
64. See infra notes 79-116 and accompanying text.
65. Louis, supra note 60, at 432.
66. Id. at 423.
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dispute. 67 According to this theory, a balancing approach affords state
courts too much discretion to search for methods of asserting jurisdiction. 68
Regardless of the Court's motive for preferring bright line jurisdiction
rules, 69 a series of these standards has evolved. 70 Each rule is applied under
the threshold minimum contacts inquiry.71 The rules are narrowly focused
on the contacts between the defendant and the forum state. 72 The effect of
each rule is to create a strong presumption in favor of personal jurisdiction
when the standard is applied to its corresponding fact pattern. 73
When deciding which bright line rule is best for any given fact pattern,
the Court appears to have examined underlying substantive issues to fully
understand the future ramifications of a stipulated rule and to ensure that
unreasonable results will not occur.74 These substantive issues, however,
are rarely mentioned by the Court when justifying the rule.75 The Court's
quest for clear rules lends credence to the suggestion that it is motivated by
"hidden agendas." '76 The term "hidden agenda" is used to denote the
67. Id. at 431. Professor Louis identified the sources of lower court bias:
The potential sources of [the forum court's] self-interest are certainly numerous. For example, an
affirmative jurisdictional finding may (1) allow the creation or augmentation of an estate or fund for
tax or local creditor purposes, (2) allow the assertion of state regulatory or taxing authority, (3)
provide a local forum for state residents, (4) allow more sympathetic, and possibly more liberal,
local juries and judges to decide issues and assess damages, (5) allow the choice of local
substantive law, and (6) obviate the need for local attorneys to seek out, rely upon and divide their
fees with out-of-state counsel [footnotes omitted].
Even though there are countervailing forces, Professor Louis doubts their ability to neutralize the
powerful local interest bias. Id.
68. Id.
69. An additional motive has been attributed to the Court. See Jay, supra note 30, at 459. Professor
Jay suggests that the Court asserted a bright line test for personal jurisdiction because "lower courts
understandably have not been able to see the light. [footnote omitted]." Id. The Court, then, may have
been persuaded to provide guidance for lower courts in the form of bright line rules that limit the relevant
considerations. Id.
70. This Note expresses no opinion regarding whether a bright line test or balancing test is the
superior approach for personal jurisdiction methodology. Instead, the Note demonstrates the Court's
movement toward bright lines and attempts to explain and define the effects of that movement.
71. See Louis, supra note 60, at 432 (bright line tests focus on the defendant's contacts).
72. See Justice Brennan's dissent in World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan's dissent also applies to Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
73. For example, in products liability cases, every person in the chain of distribution is pre-
sumptively subject to personal jurisdiction wherever the products passing through his hands are sold to
customers in the ordinary course of business. See Louis, supra note 60, at 417; see also infra notes
90-94 and accompanying text.
In libel cases, a general presumption is created in favor of jurisdiction in the forum at which the
intentional tort is aimed. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
74. See generally McDermott, Personal Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in the Supreme Court
Decisions, 10 VER. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985).
75. Id. at 2.
76. See id.
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Court's underlying policy rationale. The phrase is not intended to imply
that the Court has been underhanded when announcing its rules.
Personal jurisdiction cases seem to present sterile, doctrinal questions.
However, underlying substantive policies often motivate the Supreme
Court to make rules that apply to particular fact patterns. 77 Since each fact
pattern requires a separate rule based on distinct nondoctrinal policies, the
Court's jurisdiction rules often seem inconsistent with each other. 78 Never-
theless, careful examination of the Supreme Court's recent jurisdiction
cases reveals the underlying motivations behind each rule, demonstrating
the Court's apparent need to examine nondoctrinal issues to ensure gener-
ally fair results.
In 1977, the Court decided Shaffer v. Heitner,79 a shareholders deriva-
tive suit brought against the officers and directors of a corporation and its
subsidiary. 80 Shaffer stands for the clear rule that corporate officers and
directors may not be sued, via sequestration or attachment procedures, in
the place of incorporation merely because they are officers or directors. 81
Underlying the Shaffer decision is a concern that any other result would
lead to corporate officers being sued in distant forums for simply being an
officer or director or for owning stock with a situs in the forum. 82 A rule
other than that established by the Shaffer Court would have discouraged
individuals from becoming corporate officers in distant forums.
77. Id.
78. Id. (Court's use of hidden agendas suggests one reason why it has "failed to develop a
consistent analytically sound approach to personal jurisdiction"). Cf Jay, supra note 30, at 459 (Court
has combined "contradictory aspects of the past, leading to a situation in which lower courts
understandably have not been able to see the light") (citing to lower court opinion that complained
about lack of guidance from the Supreme Court: Powder Horn Nursery v. Soil and Plant Laboratory, 20
Ariz. App. 517, 514 P.2d 270, 272,274-75 (1973)). Cf Louis, supra note 60, at 409 ("In my opinion
the Court's new approach is a fair and workable one that strikes an appropriate balance between [fair
results and clear rules for states].").
79. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
80. Id. at 190-92. Jurisdiction was based on the attachment of stock owned by the officers and
directors and chartered in the Delaware forum. Id. The Supreme Court held that there were insufficient
contacts between the officers and directors and the forum because the defendants did not purposefully
avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum. Id. at 216. The Court notably
asserted that in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction disputes should be governed by the minimum contacts
test. Id. at 212. The Court emphasized that defendants must have a reasonable expectation of being
"haled before [the forum] court." Id.
81. See generally McDermott, supra note 74, at 26-27; Louis, supra note 60, at 412-13.
82. See McDermott, supra note 74, at 26 (attachment statute used in Shaffer would allow
jurisdiction "over any defendant who owned any stock in any company incorporated in Delaware").
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The Court's 1978 decision in Kulko v. California Superior Court83
affected interstate child support disputes. 84 The Kulko Court ruled that
allowing a child to live with a divorced spouse in another forum does not
automatically subject the consenting parent to personal jurisdiction. 85 The
rule was based on social policy considerations. 86 The Court did not want to
impede parental participation in original visitation agreements. 87 Any
other rule would discourage divorced parents from letting their children
visit ex-spouses, since such visits could expose the parent to jurisdiction in
the ex-spouses' forum. 88 The Court's result was designed to protect har-
mony in family relationships. 89
In 1980, the World-Wide decision90 indicated in dictum that when a
business delivers its products into the stream of commerce expecting that
the products will be purchased by consumers in the forum state, and when
those products subsequently injure forum consumers, the business is
subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum. 91 The World-Wide result gives
notice to designers, manufacturers, assemblers, and others in the chain of
distribution that litigation is possible when products are put into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
in the forum state.92 However, if a consumer purchases a product from a
83. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
84. Id. In Kulko, the California Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction over a New York resident
because he purposefully sent his daughter to California to live with her mother. Id. at 89. The parents
had previously divorced. The wife moved to California, the husband stayed in New York, and the two
children stayed, during the school year, in New York. After the children moved to California to live with
their mother, she sued for increased child support and full custody. Id. at 87-89. The United States
Supreme Court disallowed jurisdiction on the ground that the mother and the child initiated the activity
in California and that unilateral activity by the plaintiff does not constitute minimum contacts. Id. at 94.
85. Id. at 94.
86. Id. at 93.
87. Id. See also McDermott, supra note 74, at 23.
88. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93.
89. See id. at 98 (asserting jurisdiction would have "impose[d] an unreasonable burden on family
relations").
90. 444 U.S. at 288-90. World-Wide held that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted by an
Oklahoma court over a nonresident regional automobile distributer and a nonresident automobile dealer
in a suit arising out of an automobile accident that occurred in Oklahoma. Id. at 288-90. The Oklahoma
forum did not have jurisdiction over the retailer and distributer because they did not initiate activity with
the forum. Instead, the unilateral activities of the plaintiff, by driving into Oklahoma, established
activity with the forum. Id. at 298.
91. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 for a verbatim restatement of the World-Wide rule.
92. See Louis, supra note 60, at 417:
A manufacturer or distributer is subject to jurisdiction in any state in which it makes efforts,
directly or indirectly, to market its products, including their delivery 'into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State"' [quoting
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298, where the Court suggests comparison with Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)]. In other words, every
person in the chain of distribution is presumptively amenable to jurisdiction on a products liability
claim wherever the goods passing through his hands are eventually sold to consumers in the
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local dealer and takes the product to another forum where the consumer is
injured, the distant forum cannot exercise jurisdiction over the dealer.
Had the Court allowed jurisdiction in World-Wide, local businesses from
across the country could be haled into distant courts solely because those
businesses had some previous contact with the product. 93 The Court
expressed concern that local entreprenuers would be exposed to suit even
though products had been removed from the stream of commerce. This risk
could severely disrupt interstate commerce and could financially over-
whelm small businesses. 94
In 1980, the Court also decidedRush v. Savchuk,95 which invalidated the
"Seider doctrine. ",96 The Seider doctrine allowed plaintiffs to sue nonresi-
dent defendants in the plaintiffs' home states by attaching the defendants'
liability insurance policies. The Rush Court asserted that minimum con-
tacts are not met when the nonresident defendant's only contact with the
forum was an insurance policy with a company doing business in the forum
state.97 By ruling that the lower court did not have jurisdiction in Rush, the
Court forced the plaintiff to sue in a forum other than his home state. The
Court, then, was concerned with preventing a forum from applying its
substantive law to tort actions that are more appropriately the affairs of
other states.98 Further, the Seider doctrine unfairly left defendants exposed
to suit wherever their insurance companies had an office.
In 1984, the Court addressed personal jurisdiction disputes in two libel
cases. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,99 the Court found it "unquestiona-
ble" that minimum contacts existed between the defendant and the forum,
since the defendant deliberately entered the forum's market by sending
magazines there.100 Calder v. Jones,101 the second libel case, allowed
jurisdiction over a nonresident reporter and editor of the magazine that
published the libelous material.
ordinary course of business.
93. The Court demonstrated its concern, suggesting that a different result would mean "[e]very
seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to
suit would travel with the chattel." World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 296. The Court's concern can be illustrated
by the possibility of a local druggist being amenable to jurisdiction in a distant forum when a cigarette
lighter explodes in that forum. See Jay, supra note 30, at 449.
•94. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 296.
95. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
96. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966) (contract obligations of insurance
companies to insureds under liability insurance policies are debts that can be attached under state law if
the insurer does business in the forum state).
97. Rush, 444 U.S. at 332-33.
98. See Jay, supra note 30, at 470-71.
99. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
100. Id. at 774, 777. The Keeton decision demonstrated that once minimum contacts are found to
exist, it is very difficult to prove that jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id. at 774.
101. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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Both Keeton and Calder are examples of the Court's general presump-
tion in favor of jurisdiction when defendants are charged with intentional
actions expressly aimed at the forum state. 102 This rule is grounded on the
notion that intentional torts are based on purposeful conduct directly aimed
at forum residents. 103 According to the Court, selling the libelous maga-
zines or tabloids constituted intentional, tortious activity, sufficient to
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. 104
Also in 1984, the Court decided Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall. 0 5 In Helicopteros, the Court adopted two new personal
jurisdiction labels: "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. Since general
jurisdiction applies to those cases where the cause of action is unrelated to
the defendant's activities in the forum, 106 it requires that the defendant have
systematic and continuous activities in the forum. 107 Specific jurisdiction,
on the other hand, may be asserted in cases where the claim arises out of or
relates to the defendant's activity with the forum. Under specific jurisdic-
tion disputes, because the claims have a nexus with the activity, a single and
isolated contact can be sufficient. 108
The Helicopteros Court provided the distinct rule that purchases made in
the forum, even if occurring at regular intervals, are insufficient to con-
stitute the systematic and continuous activity necessary for assertion of
general jurisdiction. 109 Helicopteros highlights the difficulty of obtaining
general jurisdiction in contract cases. 10 The underlying policy for the
Helicopteros rule is that it would be undesirable for United States trade if
foreign purchasers111 were forced to defend suits in the states on claims
resulting from use of the American product on foreign soil. 112
102. Id. at 789. See also McDermott, supra note 74, at 41.
103. See McDermott, supra note 74, at 41.
104. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
105. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Helicopteros involved a wrongful death action brought in Texas against
a Colombian corporation whose helicopter crashed in Peru. The defendant corporation provided
helicopter transportation for South American companies. Id. at 410. The defendant's contacts with
Texas were (1) that the defendant's chief executive officer flew to Texas to negotiate the transportation
contract, (2) that the defendant purchased most of its helicopters from a Texas company, and (3) that the
defendant's helicopter pilots, including the pilot of the helicopter in the crash at issue, were sent for
training to Texas. Id. at 416.
106. Id. at 414-15.
107. Id.
108. Id. See generally von Mehren & Trautman,Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, 79 HARv. L. REv.1121
(1966) (comprehensive analysis of the sources of general and specific jurisdiction).
109. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.
110. See Knudsen, Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros, and Burger King-nternational Shoe's Most
Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAMt L. REv. 809, 830-32 (1985).
111. Although the defendant in Helicopteros was a foreign buyer, the Court gave no indication that
its general jurisdiction rule would not apply to sellers. The same policy rationale of protecting
international trade would apply whether dealing with foreign buyers or sellers.
112. See McDermott, supra note 74, at 45 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
Vol. 61:703, 1986
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The Court stated its Helicopteros rule broadly, suggesting that it applies
to situations beyond foreign purchases.113 The Court's hidden agenda,
though, would seem to suggest that the rule is only applicable to foreign
purchases since the Court meant to protect international trade. 114 It is
uncertain from this broad articulation whether United States buyers, pur-
chasing from United States sellers, are subject to Helicopteros' rigorous
rule. When the Court fails to state its substantive agenda or provide a
specific rule, lower courts may apply the standard to fact patterns that are
not within the parameters of the Court's policy rationale."I5 Therefore, the
Court should enunciate its hidden agendas or state distinct rules to avoid
misapplication.
Although the Court's recent personal jurisdiction decisions demonstrate
a pattern toward finding bright line jurisdiction rules with substantive
underpinnings, the Burgej King opinion provided few clear rules for
specific jurisdiction contract cases.' 1 6
IV. BURGER KING: A QUESTION OF FAIR WARNING TO A
CONTRACTING PARTY
A. The Facts Before the Court
In 1978, Rudzewicz and MacShara, citizens of Michigan, applied for a
franchise to Burger King's Michigan district office hoping to affiliate
11-14, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)). See Knudsen, supra
note 110, at 828 n.135 (Court never mentioned the real reason for its decision-an adverse effect on
foreign trade).
113. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 ("[M]ere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are
not enough to warrant a State's assertion of inpersonanjurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a
cause of action not related to those purchase transactions (citing to Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
114. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
115. The Court cited the Rosenberg case, 260 U.S. 516 (1923), as direct support for its rule.
Rosenberg, decided in 1923, utilized the presence theory, see supra note 9, to deny a New York court
jurisdiction over a small retailer of men's clothing who had purchased a large part of its merchandise
from the plaintiff in New York. 260 U.S. at 518. The retailermade the purchases by correspondence and
by its officers directly visiting the New York seller. Id. The Court concluded that "[v]isits on such
business, even if occurring at regular intervals, would not warrant the inference that the corporation was
-present within the jurisdiction of the State." Id.
The cite to Rosenberg indicates that the Helicopteros rule could be applied to United States purchases
from United States sellers. However, Rosenberg is not persuasive precedent since it was decided over 60
years before Helicopteros, when interstate commerce meant something entirely different than it does
today. Moreover, Rosenberg relied on the presence theory of jurisdiction: a fictional theory previously
abandoned by the Court. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
Therefore, the Court's reliance on Rosenberg is arguably suspect, as are any deductions made from the
Rosenberg opinion. Regardless, the Court suggested that Rosenberg is good law under the recent
personal jurisdiction test. The point remains, however, that the Court should articulate its hidden
agendas or state its rules in specific terms, to avoid misapplication of its rules.
116. See infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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themselves with Burger King's nationwide organization. 117 The applica-
tion was forwarded to Burger King's Miami, Florida headquarters, where a
preliminary agreement was entered into with the franchisees. "18 After four
months of negotiations and close to a final agreement, the parties began to
disagree over certain contract provisions. 119 During the disputes, the fran-
chisees negotiated with the Michigan district office as well as the Miami
headquarters and ultimately signed a final contract providing that the
franchise relationship be established in Miami, that it be governed by
Florida law, and that all payments be to the Miami headquarters. 120 The
franchisees obtained limited concessions from the Miami headquarters. '21
The twenty-year franchise relationship obligated Rudzewicz and MacShara
to payments exceeding one million dollars. 122
In 1979, when the franchisees fell behind in their monthly payments to
the Miami headquarters, the parties again entered into extended negotia-
tions. 123 After Burger King officials in Florida unsuccessfully negotiated
by mail and telephone, the headquarters terminated the relationship, order-
ing the franchisees to vacate the premises. 124 The franchisees refused and
continued to operate the restaurant. 125 Burger King then sued in a Florida
federal court for breach of contract and trademark infringement. 126 The
district court asserted jurisdiction, but was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 127 The United States Supreme Court, however, upheld
the district court's assertion of jurisdiction. 128
B. Elaboration of the Two-Pronged Test
The Burger King Court reasserted its previously used two-pronged test
for personal jurisdiction: (1) minimum contacts; and (2) fair play and
reasonableness. 129 Under the first prong, the Court emphasized that indi-
viduals must have fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to
117. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2179.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2178-79.
121. Id. at 2179 & n.8. For example, the franchisees secured a $10,439 reduction in rent their third
year.
122. Id. at 2179.
123. Id. at 2179-80.
124. Id. at 2180.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
128. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2180-81. Rudzewicz, alone, appealed the lower court judgment
and only appealed the breach of contract claim.
129. Id. at 2182-85.
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jurisdiction in a certain forum. 130 Fair warning, if it exists, is sufficient to
establish minimum contacts. 131 Minimum contacts, then, operate to safe-
guard the individual liberty interest because potential defendants have fair
warning of their susceptibility to personal jurisdiction. Defendants are
afforded an opportunity to structure their conduct with some assurance as
to where they might be subject to suit. 132 The Court reaffirmed its use of the
five reasonableness factors that were synthesized in World-Wide, 133 again
stressing that the reasonableness considerations should not be taken into
account until the threshold fair warning requirement is met. 134
130. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2182. Fair warning is not anew concept in the Court's developing
personal jurisdiction doctrine. The concept originated in Hanson when the Court held that a defendant
must "purposefully [avail] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State."
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Shaffer, the Court required that defendants have
reason to expect to be "haled before [the forum] court." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977),
cited in Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-99 (1978).
In World-Wide, the Court stated that "[w]hen a [defendant] 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State,' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, it has clear notice
that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by. . . severing
its connection with the State." (emphasis added). World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
131. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2183 (foreseeability of causing injury is not sufficient to
establish necessary contacts, but foreseeability of being "haled into court" is sufficient) (quoting
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297).
132. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2182:
By requiring that individuals have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign" [citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment)], the Due Process Clause "gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit" [citing World-Wide,
444 U.S. at 297].
133. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. Again, the five reasonableness factors are: (1)
the defendant's burden; (2) the plaintiff's interest; (3) the forum state's interest; (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest; (5) the shared interest of the several states. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292.
The reasonableness factors are not extensively dealt with in this Note. Commentators have correctly
perceived that the threshold minimum contacts prong is the cutting edge of the Court's approach. Louis,
supra note 60, at 422. Nonetheless, the Court can be criticized for not explaining the apparent similarity
between the personal jurisdiction reasonableness factors and the factors examined in forum non
conveniens and choice of law doctrines. See, e.g., Brewer, Jurisdiction in Single Contract Cases, 6 U.
ARK. LrrrLE RoCK L.J. 1, 17 (1983); see also Seidelson, Recasting World-wide Volkswagen as a
Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach, 19 Tut.SA L.J. 1, 9 (1983); Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in
Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375, 378 n.23 (1981). See
generally Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 872 (1980). A second
criticism of the reasonableness factors pertains to the Court's reasoning for relegating the plaintiff's due
process interest to lesser importance than the defendant's due process interest. See Lewis, A Brave New
WorldforPersonal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Un iform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1, 8 & n.25
(1984).
134. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 ("Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of
[reasonableness] factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport
with 'fair play and substantial justice' "(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320)).
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For the first time, the Court suggested that a rebuttable presumption in
favor of jurisdiction exists if the defendant had fair warning. 135 Evidence
that the Court used a presumption is found in two separate parts of the
opinion. First, the Court stated that if a defendant availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in the forum, satisfying the fair warning
requirement, then "it is presumptively not unreasonable" to allow jurisdic-
tion in the forum. 136 Second, in the Court's discussion of the contacts
between Rudzewicz and the forum, the Court stated that "it was . . .
presumptively reasonable for Rudzewicz to be called to account there for
[the] injuries. "137 The defendant has the burden of rebutting the presump-
tion by presenting a compelling case that it would be unreasonable for the
forum court to assert jurisdiction even if the defendant had fair warning. 138
The two-pronged test makes it very difficult to overcome a threshold
finding that the minimum contacts requirement is met. 139 The reason-
ableness considerations will only overcome the presumption in favor of
jurisdiction if a party is put to a severe disadvantage. 140 Moreover, most
considerations that would render jurisdiction unreasonable can usually be
accommodated with the forum non conveniens doctrine or with choice of
law rules. 141
C. The Clear Rules Movement Postponed
In some previous lower court cases it had been argued that a single
contract, without more, provided sufficient minimum contacts between a
nonresident defendant and the forum state. 142 Nevertheless, there remained
a deep division on this issue. 143 The Burger King Court ruled that a single
contractual relationship between a forum resident and a nonresident does
135. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 2186.
136. Id. at 2184.
137. Id. at 2186.
138. Id. at 2185. For an article stating that the Court's "tremendous [procedural] change" is
significant and salutory, see Knudsen, suora note 110, at 840, 845. Professor Knudsen notes a "past
general rule that placed the entire burden of proving jurisdiction on the plaintiff." Id. at 839 & n.211
(citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188 (1936); Taylor v. Portland
Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967); Northcross v. Joslyn Fruit Co., 439 F. Supp. 371,
376 (D. Ariz. 1977)).
139. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Lakeside Bridge& Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907,909-10 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases which assert that a single contract is
sufficient).
143. Id. at 909 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("the question has deeply divided
the federal and state courts").
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not automatically satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. 144 This single
contract standard provides little guidance for lower courts faced with
determining how a contract relates to the defendant's affiliation with the
forum. 145 The Court provided no other rules. Perhaps the Court was
reluctant to address the myriad of factual possibilities in contract cases.
The Court stalled the clear rules movement at a crucial juncture. If due
process is intended to give fair warning, then contract relationships demand
clear rules upon which contracting parties can rely. Certainty of result is a
prime goal of contracting parties. 146 A potential defendant cannot predict
amenability to suit without precise, workable personal jurisdiction rules. 147
The Burger King Court admitted that the due process clause should provide
opportunities for individuals to anticipate where they might be amenable to
jurisdiction. 148 If individuals are uncertain about their amenability to suit
because there are no clear rules, then they might choose to avoid certain
contractual relationships for fear of having to litigate in inconvenient
forums. 149 Interstate transactions are thus assisted by bright line rules.
V. BURGER KING: FLAWS IN THE FAIR WARNING CONCEPT
The Court's reliance on fair warning to establish minimum contacts does
not provide a great deal of certainty for contracting parties. The fair
warning notion relies on circular reasoning. The concept is based on the
premise that parties can anticipate their own amenability to personal
jurisdiction. However, contracting parties cannot anticipate amenability to
144. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2185.
145. The Court did examine the contacts between Rudzewicz and Florida, but did not enunciate a
clear rule for contract cases. The Burger King case was relatively easy for the Court to decide since
Rudzewicz had numerous and long term contacts with Florida. In addition, Rudzewicz was a knowl-
edgeable business person with extensive experience as an accountant. Id. at 2179. Rudzewicz also
agreed to the Florida choice of law provision.
146. See Lakeside Bridge, 445 U.S. at 910-11 (White, L, dissenting from denial of certiorari).
147. The Court has translated the fair warning requirement into a somewhat more practical
approach. Jay, supra note 30, at 444. Defendants should have "some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. Under this
approach, defendants will nonetheless need clear rules to give them the requisite assurance of where
they will be held accountable for their actions.
148. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2182.
149. See Lakeside Bridge, 445 U.S. at 910-11 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari):
"The question at issue [personal jurisdiction in contract cases] is one of considerable importance to
contractual dealings between purchasers and sellers located in different States. The disarray among
federal and state courts . . . may well have a disruptive effect on commercial relations in which
certainty of result is a prime objective." Cf. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533,577: "[C]are should be taken. . . not to...
discourage people from engaging in interstate transactions [footnotes omitted]."
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personal jurisdiction unless they know the rule for jurisdiction. 150 There-
fore, contracting parties, to predict jurisdiction, need rules based on
something other than their own anticipation of amenability to jurisdiction.
Moreover, if a rule is ambiguous or if the judicial decision will be based on
complex or multiple factors, the parties' predictions about amenability to
suit are less than reliable.
Burger King's jurisdictional approach relies on legal conclusions such as
whether there is a "purposeful availment," a "continuing obligation," or a
"substantial connection.' 15 1 However, it is virtually impossible for a
potential defendant to predict how a judge will characterize a particular
activity. 152 As a result, contracting parties have inadequate information on
which to base decisions about where and when to conduct their commercial
activities if they want to avoid subjecting themselves to suit in a particular
forum.
Therefore, the Court's own analytical structure mandates a bright line
rule for contract cases. The analysis emphasizes fair warning to the defend-
ant, but a defendant is most fairly warned with a bright line rule. Admit-
tedly, jurisdictional rules cannot completely eliminate uncertainty since
there is room for some discretion in virtually any approach taken. Never-
theless, the fair warning problem could be mitigated in many instances; the
key is to avoid ambiguous balancing processes.
VI. BEYOND BURGER KING: A PROPOSED BRIGHT LINE
PERSONAL JURISDICTION RULE FOR CONTRACT
DISPUTES
Contract transactions can be separated into two categories: (1) transac-
tions involving the typical individual consumer, and (2) transactions in the
commercial context. 153 The individual consumer category is exemplified
150. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. The fair warning inquiry centers on the defendants' ability
"to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where conduct will or will not
render them liable to suit." Id. But see World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan said: "[T]he reasoning begs the question. A defendant cannot know if his actions will
subject him to jurisdiction in another State until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction is."
151. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2183-84.
152. Although a valuable aid, precedent alone cannot be relied upon to determine whether a
defendant's situation might lead to jurisdiction. A court would be forced to deny jurisdiction any time
prior cases did not provide explicit approval of jurisdiction. A fair forum could be denied jurisdiction
solely because there was no precedent. Jurisdiction would thus be locked into a "perpetual status quo."
Jay, supra note 30, at 443.
153. See generally Currie, supra note 149, at 576-77. Professor Currie suggests a distinction
between Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962), and Conn v.
Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959). In both cases jurisdiction over the buyer was not
allowed (in Conn, the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce an Illinois judgment against the buyer,
while in Hilson the forum court refused to assert jurisdiction). In Hilson, the buyer was a business
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by the standard mail-order customer who agrees to a rigid offer with fixed
terms. 154 The second category consists of transactions where the purchaser
is a corporation or some other commercial individual or enterprise. The
distinction is made because a different rule should be applied to each
category. Individual customers cannot be expected to exercise a great deal
of business sophistication. 155 By contrast, most corporations and other
business entities can be expected to have a higher degree of business
experience and expertise.156
A threshold determination should designate the category into which the
buyer fits. This determination would involve legal conclusions by the trial
judge. 157 Since defendants would have to anticipate a judge's decision,
there would be uncertainty in a few borderline cases. However, in most
cases it should not be difficult to conclude the category into which a
particular buyer fits. The first category would be defined very narrowly and
would not usually include buyers other than those who engage in mail-
order type transactions, procurement of insurance policies, or other small
scale consumer contracts. 158
Once the disputed transaction was categorized, a bright line rule could
be articulated for each category. Accordingly, where the transaction in-
volved an individual consumer, the consumer's forum should have personal
jurisdiction over the litigation ("consumer's forum rule"). 159 In business
corporation, while in Conn the buyer was an individual mail-order consumer. The decisive factor
distinguishing the cases was that the business in Hilson had not sent agents into the seller's state, as had
the individual consumer in Conn. Had the Hilson buyer sent agents into the seller's state, Professor
Currie suggests that the court might have asserted jurisdiction over the buyer. The cases would then be
distinguishable only because the buyer in Conn was an individual mail-order buyer while the-buyer in
Hilson was a business purchaser.
154. See, e.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
155. That individuals cannot be expected to negotiate in mail-order or insurance type transactions
has given rise to contract principles governing "adhesion" contracts. See Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632-33 (1943)
("[S]tandardized contracts have. . . been used to control and regulate the distribution of goods from
producer all the way down to the ultimate consumer."). See generally Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
156. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 108, at 1167-68 (distinction between
consumer and corporation is illustrated by multistate activities of corporations versus localized
existence of consumers). Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("When
claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an
action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof.").
157. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text for discussion of legal conclusions presently
used by the Court.
158. For example, the rule would apply to cases like Conn, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (mail-
order); McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (insurance contract); and Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State
Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (insurance contract).
159. For the purposes of the consumer's forum rule, the consumer's forum would be relatively easy
to locate. In nearly all cases, the consumer's forum would be the forum to which the products were
delivered to the buyer for consumption.
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relationships, the rule needs slight modification and less rigidity. For
corporate entities or sophisticated business persons, a presumption in favor
of personal jurisdiction in the buyer's forum should be created ("commer-
cial enterprises rule"). 160 The presumption could be overcome, however,
by a freely negotiated and reasonable forum selection clause, by the
defendant showing that the buyer fully expected that a suit would occur in
the seller's forum, or by the defendant showing that the buyer's forum
would be unreasonable.
A. Overcoming the Presumption Under the Commercial Enterprises
Rule
Three avenues could be used to overcome a presumption in favor of the
buyer's forum. Each of the methods for overcoming the presumption is
consistent with the Court's previous jurisdiction pronouncements. First, as
the Burger King Court indicated, forum selection clauses, when freely
negotiated and reasonable, are a means for establishing jurisdiction in the
seller's forum. 161 Contracting parties should therefore make forum selec-
tion clauses an integral part of contract negotiations. 162 Contracting parties
would be able to stipulate the forum for solving any disputes, thus satisfy-
ing the Court's ardor for predictability. 163
Second, there are certain factors which would overcome the presumption
that the buyer's forum is most appropriate, by establishing that the buyer
fully expected any litigation to occur in the seller's forum. 164 For example,
the Burger King Court isolated factors which, when taken together, can
overcome the presumption. The Court pointed out that the franchisees
derived unique benefits by affiliating themselves with the nationwide
160. The buyer's forum, in a business relationship, would not be difficult to locate. As with the
consumer's forum rule, the buyer's forum would usually be the forum to which the products are sold.
Some judicial discretion may be involved in determining if a forum other than the place of delivery was
thought, by either party, to be the buyer's forum for application of the rule. When drafting forum
selection clauses, the parties should always stipulate which forum is to be considered the buyer's,
especially if a forum other than the place of delivery were to be used.
161. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 n. 14 (citing Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703) (personal jurisdiction
requirement is a waivable right); National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,316 (1964) (parties
may stipulate, in advance, to submit potential controversies to a particular forum); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 17 (1972) (forum selection provisions are enforceable and not
offensive to due process if they are "freely negotiated" and not "unreasonable and unjust")).
162. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-14. The choice of forum clause in The Bremen was given full
effect since it was made in an arms-length transaction by experienced and sophisticated businessmen.
Uncertainty and inconvenience can be avoided if forum selection clauses are negotiated and agreed to in
advance.
163. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2182.
164. See id. at 2178-80, 2185-89.
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Burger King organization. 165 The franchisee had entered a long term,
twenty-year contractual relationship with the franchisor. 166 In the negotia-
tions between the Florida headquarters and the franchisees, the franchisees
obtained concessions. 167 The contract documents demonstrated that the
real decisionmaking authority for Burger King was vested in the Miami
headquarters and not the Michigan district office. 168 The franchisees en-
gaged in direct and continuous communication, by mail and telephone,
with the Florida offices. 169 Furthermore, the choice of law provision in the
contract supported the notion that the franchisees anticipated the pos-
sibility of suit in Florida.170
Third, the presumption in favor of the corporate buyer's forum could be
overcome if the defendant provided a compelling case demonstrating the
unreasonableness of jurisdiction in the buyer's forum. 171 Defendants would
have this safety valve even if they failed to show the existence of a freely
negotiated, fair forum selection clause 72 and failed to provide extensive
evidence demonstrating that the buyer should reasonably have expected
litigation in the seller's forum. 173 Such a reasonableness requirement
would provide the flexibility necessary to prevent rigid, unfair results. 174
B. Support for the Proposed Bright Line Rules
The proposed bright line rules for both types of contract disputes has
doctrinal as well as substantive support. 175 First, the Court's own fair
warning doctrine demands a bright line rule so that contracting parties can
adequately predict their amenability to suit. 176 The proposed rules would
guarantee that contracting parties know about a Court's predisposition
165. Id. at 2189.
166. Id. at 2179, 2187.
167. Id. at 2179.
168. Id. at 2186-87.
169. Id. at2187.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2184-85.
172. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
174." Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184-89. See supra note 133 for a list of the five reasonableness
factors. The reasonableness prong, as a safeguard, is purposefully absent from the consumer's forum
rule. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. The reason for its absence is that the initial
categorization of the buyer as an individual consumer or as a business entity provides the trial court
sufficient flexibility and discretion to avoid unfair results.
175. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text for specific support of the consumer's forum
rule; see also infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text for specific support of the commercial
enterprises rule.
176. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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toward the buyer's or consumer's forum. 177 Parties would also be aware that
there are three ways to overcome the presumption favoring the buyer's
forum in business relationships. 178
A substantive advantage of the proposed rules is that they would not be
susceptible to rigid, unfair application. Under the commercial enterprises
rule, if the seller's forum was especially appropriate, as in Burger King,
then the presumption of jurisdiction in the buyer's forum could be over-
come. 179 Use of a presumption, instead of a rigid, absolute rule, would
satisfy the Court's prediliction for fair warning while permitting flexibility
for cases not contemplated by the author of an inflexible rule. 180 Even under
the consumer's forum rule, the trial court would have flexibility and
discretion to avoid unfair results by characterizing the mold into which the
buyer will fit. 181
The proposed standards are further supported by their compatibility with
the Court's propensity to avoid interfering with interstate commerce. 182
Because results would be predictable, the rules would assist those sellers
engaged in interstate contracts. If the potential cost of litigation in a distant
forum was too high, sellers could abstain from selling their products there
or insist on a forum selection clause. 183
Additionally, the proposed rules are supported by their applicability and
effectiveness in various commercial disputes. The rule would be applicable
and workable, for example, in transactions involving individual consum-
ers, small businesses, or large corporations. 184 The applicability of the
commercial enterprises rule to Burger King's franchise problem is evi-
dence of usage beyond disputes involving typical buy/sell transactions.
1. Specific Rationale for the Consumer's Forum Rule
The consumer's forum rule is consistent with the Court's prior jurisdic-
tion philosophy and conforms to general principles of fairness. The Court
177. The fair warning requirement would be satisfied because the requirement is based on a clear
rule that favors the buyer's forum.
178. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. See Burger King, 105 S Ct. at 2189.
181. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text for the two categories of contract transactions.
182. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (evidence of the Court avoiding interference with
interstate commerce in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
183. With a bright line rule, sellers could realistically anticipate their amenability to suit and can
thus predict, with some certainty, the potential cost of litigation in a particular forum. Sellers would not
be compelled to abstain from selling their products in certain forums because of highly speculative
beliefs that they may be amenable to suit. A bright line rule would remove the uncertainty, possibly
encouraging interstate commerce where none had occurred before.
184. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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has long demonstrated ajurisdiction philosophy that is sensitive to individ-
ual consumers. Most recently, the Burger King Court acknowledged that
consumer relationships require unique attention.18 5 Previously, in McGee
v. International Life Insurance Co., 18 6 the Court held that an individual
purchaser of life insurance could sue the out-of-state insurance company in
the buyer's forum. The McGee Court ruled that the contract had a substan-
tial connection with the consumer's forum and that jurisdiction could be
asserted on that basis. 18 7 The Court's opinion in Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 demonstrated the same philosophy
favoring the individual consumer's forum. The Travelers Health Court
allowed jurisdiction in a consumer's forum over a mail-order insurance
business that created continuing obligations with individual consumers in
the forum state. 189
Moreover, general principles of fairness support the consumer's forum
rule. Ordinary consumers should not be expected to negotiate choice of
forum issues. 190 Additionally, individual consumers probably do not con-
template the jurisdiction question when making a purchase. 191 If the seller
inserts a choice of forum clause into the contract, ordinary consumers
probably would not recognize the provision's potential significance.19 2
With the proposed consumer's forum rule, sellers would have fair warning
of potential litigation in the consumer's forum and could conduct their
activities accordingly. Consumers would be protected from the unreasona-
ble burden of litigating in a distant forum. 193
185. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2189.
186. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
187. Id. at 223.
188. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
189. Id. at 647.
190. It offends common sense to treat a printed form which closes an installment sale [of farm
equipment] as embodying terms to all of which the individual knowingly assented. The sales pitch
aims solely at getting the signature on the form and wastes no time explaining or even mentioning
the print. Before [finding] that an individual purchaser has knowingly and intelligently consented
to be sued in another State, . .more proof of the fact [should be required] than is provided by his
mere signature on the form.
National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 334 (1964) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. It strains credulity to suggest that these Michigan farmers ever read this contractual
provision about. . . 'accepting service of any process within the [forum) State' . . . . And it
exhausts credulity to think that they or any other laymen reading these legalistic words would have
known or even suspected that they amounted to an agreement of the [defendants] to let the
company sue them in [the forum state] should any controversy arise.
Id. at 332-33 (Black, J., dissenting).
192. See id.
193. See Spiegel, Inc., v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976). The Seventh Circuit upheld an order
issued by the Federal Trade Commission insofar as the order mandated that the Spiegel catalog retailer
cease and desist from suing mail-order customers in a Cook County, Illinois forum, where Spiegel has
its principal place of business. The court held that the Commission exceeded its authority by finding that
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2. Specific Rationale for the Commercial Enterprises Rule
A bright line rule favoring the buyer's forum in business relationships
would be more appropriate than a rule favoring the seller's forum. 194
Generally, jurisdiction has been asserted over nonresident defendant sellers
in the buyer's forum more often than over nonresident defendant buyers in
the seller's forum. 195 The proposed rule is thus consistent with the trend in
lower court decisions since both the rule and the court decisions favor the
buyer's forum. Moreover, sellers usually initiate transactions with the
buyers and set most of the terms on which they will sell. 196 It is the seller,
then, who customarily has control over the terms of the contract and who
can increase prices if the cost or risk of distant litigation is too high. Buyers
do not have similar means of compensating themselves for distant litiga-
tion. Therefore, the realities of our economy provide a strong basis for a
bright line rule presuming jurisdiction in the buyer's forum instead of the
seller's forum. 197
The commercial enterprises rule, at initial glance, seems inconsistent
with Burger King's holding that jurisdiction be allowed over the fran-
chisees in the franchisor's forum. 198 The proposed rule would create a
presumption in favor of a buyer's forum or, in a franchise suit, in the
franchisee's forum. 199 The proposed rule, however, is consistent with
Burger King. Burger King's holding indicates, without doubt, that the
Spiegel's actions amounted to a per se violation of the due process clause, but nonetheless upheld the
Commission's order under the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6)(1982). See
540 F.2d at 291-95 (section 5 states inter alia: "[t]he Commission is empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce"). The Spiegel case demonstrates judicial recognition
of the unreasonable burden placed on mail-order consumers when faced with litigation in the seller's
forum. See 540 F.2d at 294.
194. Courts have often distinguished between the buyer's and the seller's forum. See, e.g., Oswalt
Indus. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307, 312-13 (D. Kan. 1969); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1201 (1968). But see
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1972) (buyer/seller
distinction has some usefulness, but care should be taken to distinguish between active and passive
buyers).
195. See In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 232; Oswalt, 297 F. Supp. at 312-13. See also Currie, supra note
149, at 576.
196. See In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 233.
197. Some commentators and judges warn against excessive use of the buyer/seller distinction. See
In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 233; Currie, supra note 149, at 576. The proposed commercial enterprises rule
accommodates this warning by utilizing a rebuttable presumption. See supra notes 161-74 and
accompanying text. The In-Flight court expressed concern over the notion that certain buyers can
hardly be characterized as passive parties. In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 233. The proposed rule would provide
adequate flexibility to accommodate those situations where buyers were especially active and the
seller's forum was, thereby, appropriate. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
198. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2190.
199. A franchisor is equivalent to a seller and a franchisee is equivalent to a buyer.
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seller's or franchisor's forum can be appropriate.200 However, the Court
reached its conclusion after a detailed examination of the extensive factual
background, which pointed toward jurisdiction in the seller's forum.20'
Indeed, the Burger King opinion seems to contain an unstated presumption
favoring the buyer's forum, a presumption overcome by the extensive facts
that gave the Burger King defendant warning of suit in Florida.202 The
entire opinion is devoted to demonstrating. that courts must carefully
analyze the factual underpinnings of each case to determine if the seller's
forum is appropriate. 20 3
In addition to drawing support from the Burger King opinion, the
commercial enterprises rule gains support from its favorable treatment of
both buyers and sellers. Buyers enjoy the presumption of jurisdiction in
their home forum. Sellers, likewise, enjoy the certainty of knowing where
their conduct will likely make them amenable to suit. Sellers, then, can
take protective measures, such as increasing prices to compensate for the
risk of distant litigation or negotiating a forum selection clause. Moreover,
if sellers do not want to risk amenability in distant forums they can sell their
products elsewhere.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent personal jurisdiction cases prior to Burger King, the Supreme
Court provided bright line rules to determine jurisdiction in various factual
contexts.0 4 Although the Burger King Court did not provide a distinct rule
for contract cases, it elaborated on its two-pronged test for personal
jurisdiction and emphasized that fair warning to the defendant is the
decisive personal jurisdiction requirement.20 5 The fair warning require-
ment, however, is flawed and demonstrates the need for a bright line rule in
contract disputes. 206
A rule establishing personal jurisdiction in the consumer's forum in
contract disputes would be reasonable and consistent with the Court's prior
jurisdiction philosophy favoring buyers and seeking clear rules. 207 A modi-
fication of the rule creating a presumption in favor of the buyer's forum
200. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2185 (the Court found substantial record evidence supporting
the assertion of jurisdiction over the franchisee, in the franchisor's forum).
201. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2178-80, 2185-89.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See supra notes 60-116 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 153-59, 185-93 and accompanying text.
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would be desirable for transactions involving corporate entities or knowl-
edgeable business people.208 The presumption in business situations could
be overcome by using a forum selection clause, by demonstrating that the
buyer expected litigation in the seller's forum, or by showing that jurisdic-
tion in the buyer's forum is unreasonable. 209 Both proposed rules are
consistent with the Court's prior jurisdiction pronouncements, are com-
patible with interstate commerce, and are broadly applicable.
Paul Eric Clay
208. See supra notes 153-60, 194-203 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
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